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I. INTRODUCTION
The arbitrator's analysis ignores the obvious-violence in the
workplace is an ever increasing occurrence that creates serious
safety and health issues for employers. His analysis also ignores
the reality that workplace anger and violence is often ignored by
employers who fail to take appropriate steps to defuse potential
violence before it erupts. The evidence before this arbitrator was
that [the grievant's] threats created fear and concern for the safety
of others. This Court can find no rationality in a decision that
seeks to protect a threatening and intimidating employee in the
workplace while requiring the recipients of such conduct and
others in the workplace to work in fear or under intimidating
circumstances. I
The adoption of a zero-tolerance workplace violence policy 2 has become
standard practice for a majority of employers.3 Zero-tolerance policies put
* Daniel V. Johns is a graduate of the University of Notre Dame and the University
of Virginia School of Law. He is a partner in the Philadelphia office of the law firm of
Ballard Spahr Andrews & Ingersoll, LLP. Mr. Johns specializes in labor and employment
law. The views expressed in the article are solely those of the author.
1 Catholic Cemeteries v. R.I. Laborers Dist. Council, 177 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2148,
2154 (2005). The Catholic Cemeteries decision vacated an arbitrator's decision that
reinstated an employee who had made threatening comments to co-workers. Id. at 2151-
54. For a discussion of the court's decision and the underlying facts of the case, see
Edward Fitzpatrick, Judge Upholds Dismissal of Worker over Threats, THE PROVIDENCE
J., Apr. 28, 2005, at AOl.
2 See infra Part III.A for an extensive discussion of zero-tolerance workplace
violence policies.
3 Indeed, a simple search of the internet for examples of zero-tolerance workplace
violence policies reveals hundreds of examples. See, e.g., City of Stamford and Stamford
Board of Education Zero-Tolerance Workplace Violence Policy,
http://cityofstamford.org/filestorage/25/52/142/256/WorkplaceViolencePolicy.pdf (last
visited March 1, 2009) ("The City/Board will not tolerate any acts of violence committed
by or against City/Board employees. ."); University of Virginia Workplace
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
employees on notice that the employer will not tolerate any threatening or
violent behavior by employees in the workplace. 4 Most zero-tolerance
policies further state that any employee found to be in violation of the policy
will be subject to significant discipline, up to and including discharge. 5
Clearly, therefore, employers who have adopted zero-tolerance policies
believe that workplace violence is a serious problem that must be quashed in
its infancy and ultimately eliminated from the workplace.
One aspect of the problem of workplace violence that has not been
closely scrutinized is the response of labor arbitrators to employee discharges
based upon violations of zero-tolerance workplace violence polices. This
article examines several recent labor arbitration decisions where employers
adopted and attempted to enforce zero-tolerance workplace violence policies,
and concludes that arbitrators have not yet completely bought into the
concept of zero-tolerance for violent or threatening employee behavior in the
workplace.6 That is, although arbitrators have begun to discuss how serious
(and potentially deadly) the problem of workplace violence has been and can
be, arbitrators' actions have not necessarily kept pace with their words. Some
arbitrators appear inclined to pay lip service to the concept of zero-tolerance,
while at the same time overlooking or justifying employee behavior that, on
its face, clearly runs afoul of the concept of zero-tolerance for threatening or
violent employee behavior.
If, as nearly everyone agrees, workplace violence is a serious issue that
employers have an obligation to address, then the current arbitral response to
zero-tolerance workplace violence policies is misguided. 7 For the sake of
Violence/Hostility Policy, http://www.hrs.virginia.edu/policies/emprel/classified/
violence.html (last visited March 1, 2009) ("This is a zero-tolerance policy, meaning that
the University disciplines or terminates every employee found to have violated the
policy.").
4 See, e.g., City of Stamford and Stamford Board of Education Zero-Tolerance
Workplace Violence Policy, supra note 3.
5Id.
6 See infra Part III.B for a discussion of recent workplace violence arbitration
decisions.
7 The societal consensus on the seriousness of the problem of workplace violence is
perhaps best reflected by the fact that the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
("OSHA") promulgated guidelines suggest that the general duty clause of the
Occupational Health and Safety Act imposes a duty on employers to provide a safe
workplace for their employees. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (2000); see also James R. Todd,
Comment, "It's Not My Problem ": How Workplace Violence and Potential Employer
Liability Lead to Employment Discrimination of Ex-Convicts, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 725, 751
(2004) ("[I]n 1996 OSHA promulgated guidelines aimed at creating a 'general duty' to
prevent workplace violence for employers in the health care, social service, and night
[Vol. 24:2 20091
ASSESSING THE ARBITRAL RESPONSE TO WORKPLACE VIOLENCE POLICIES
safeguarding the workplace and protecting both employees and the general
public, the adoption of a zero-tolerance workplace violence policy should
result in more deference to the disciplinary decisions of employers if
violations of the policy are proven at an arbitration hearing. Indeed, at the
very least, an arbitrator's consideration of typical factors that might mitigate
an employer's decision to discharge an employee for other types of work
performance issues or workplace misconduct should be curtailed or, at a
minimum, scrutinized more closely where an employer has made a conscious
decision to adopt and enforce a policy prohibiting all incidents of workplace
violence.8 For the value of deterrence alone, employers should have the right
to decide that they will not tolerate any threatening or violent employee
behavior in the workplace. They should also have the right to decide that
their employees should not be forced to live in fear of other workers who
have a history of such behavior. The arbitral concept of just cause should be
broad enough to support a zero-tolerance policy and to allow arbitrators to
uphold employee discharges for violations of such a policy. 9 The problem of
workplace violence is too serious for any other result.
retail professions."). For an interesting discussion of OSHA's attempt to regulate
workplace violence and the reaction to it, see Michael Wiesenfeld, Comment, Death of a
Salesman: A True Story About OSHA Recommendations and Workplace Homicide, 3 U.
PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 133, 141-57 (2000).
8 Perhaps the question that should be asked by arbitrators in these cases is whether
workplace violence should be treated the same way as attendance problems, drug and
alcohol violations, and other types of standard employee misconduct leading to
discipline. The premise of this article is that workplace violence is different than such
other types of employee misbehavior and should be treated accordingly by labor
arbitrators.
9 Nearly every collective bargaining agreement provides that an employer may only
discharge employees for behavior or misconduct that constitutes "just cause." Although
just cause is typically not defined in collective bargaining agreements, arbitrators often
apply a series of tests to determine whether an employer has met its burden of
establishing just cause. Those tests generally are described as follows:
1. Notice: Did the [e]mployer give to the employee forewarning of
foreknowledge of the possible or probable consequences of the
employee's disciplinary conduct?
2. Reasonable Rule or Order: Was the [e]mployer's rule of managerial
order reasonably stated to (a) the orderly, efficient, and safe operation of
the [e]mployer's business, and (b) the performance that the [e]mployer
might properly expect of the employee?
3. Investigation: Did the [elmployer, before administering the discipline to
an employee, make an effort to discover whether the employee did in fact
violate or disobey a rule or order of management?
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II. WORKPLACE VIOLENCE: THE PROBLEM
The statistics on workplace violence are both frightening and
compelling.' 0 As one commentator reported:
One out of every four employees will be a victim of workplace
violence during their life. One out of every six violent crimes
occurs in the workplace. As an occupational hazard, homicide is
the second leading cause of death, accounting for one sixth of all
occupational fatalities. Every year 1,000 people are murdered in
the workplace; another 1.5 to 2 million people are victims of
assault, rape, or robbery. Offenders use various means to disrupt
4. Fair Investigation: Was the [e]mployer's investigation conducted fairly
and objectively?
5. Proof. At the investigation, did the [e]mployer obtain substantial
evidence or proof that the employee was guilty as charged?
6. Equal Treatment: Has the [e]mployer applied its rules, orders, and
penalties even handedly and without discrimination to all employees?
7. Penalty: Was the degree of discipline administered by the [e]mployer in
a particular case reasonably related to (a) the seriousness of the
employee's proven offense, and (b) the record of the employee in his/her
service with the employer? (Were there mitigating circumstances)?
City of El Paso, 124 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1583, 1591 (2008) (Jennings, Arb.). The
seven tests of just cause were first articulated by Arbitrator Carroll Daugherty in
Enterprise Wire Co., 46 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 359 (1966). Id; See also City of Seaside,
119 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1341, 1345-46 n.2 (2004) (Reeves, Arb.). For an interesting
discussion of the meaning of just cause in the context of an analysis of the congruence of
management and labor interests in the workplace, see Roger I. Abrams & Dennis R.
Nolan, Toward a Theory of "Just Cause" in Employee Discipline Cases, 1985 DUKE L.J.
594, 610-22 (1985).
10 Statistics, perhaps, do not tell the whole story. For several examples of the horror
of workplace violence and the impact it can have on people's lives, see Ann E. Phillips,
Violence in the Workplace: Reevaluating the Employer's Role, 44 BuFF. L. REv. 139,
139-40 (1996); see also Kristine L. Hayes, Note & Comment, Prepostal Prevention of
Workplace Violence: Establishing an Ombuds Program as One Possible Solution, 14
OIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 215, 215-26 (1998) (relating the story of a postal employee
who, "reportedly angry that his request to be transferred to the day shift was denied,
killed a coworker he apparently disliked, seriously wounded a supervisor who had
reprimanded him, and injured another worker caught in the line of fire."); Wiesenfeld,
supra note 7, at 133-34 (recounting an incident where a Subway sandwich shop
employee was shot and killed while working at a store in South Pasadena, Florida).
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the workplace. For example, everyday 16,400 threats are made,
723 workers are attacked and 43,800 workers are harassed. 1
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics ("BLS") 2005 Survey of
Workplace Violence Prevention, more than five percent of American
workplaces experienced some sort of workplace violence incident during the
previous twelve months.12  Nearly half of the nation's largest
establishments-those that employ more than 1,000 workers-reported an
incident of workplace violence in the twelve month period preceding the
BLS survey. 13 Overall, public sector employers fared worse than private
sector employers, with state governments having the highest percentage of
incidents per employee. 14 Moreover, at least one study has estimated that the
annual cost of workplace violence incidents is $35 billion. 15
Workplace violence may take many forms. It can involve murder,
physical assaults, harassment, or threats. 16 The BLS categorizes workplace
violence incidents into the following groups: criminal incidents, customer or
client incidents, co-worker incidents, and domestic violence incidents. 17 The
problem is not limited to any particular workplace, as both small and large
employers, workplaces with both substantial and non-existent contact with
the public, and high-crime and low-crime working locations all reported
incidents of workplace violence during the twelve months surveyed by the
11 Kyle Riley, Employer TROs Are All the Rage: A New Approach to Workplace
Violence, 4 NEV. L.J. 1, 3 (2003).
12 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, SURVEY OF
WORKPLACE VIOLENCE PREVENTION 1 (2005),
http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshwc/osnr0026.pdf [hereinafter "BLS SURVEY"].
13 Id.
14 Id Thirty-two percent of state government employers experienced an incident of
workplace violence during the survey period. Id.
15 Amy D. Whitten & Deanne M. Mosley, Caught in the Crossfire: Employers'
Liability for Workplace Violence, 70 Miss. L.J. 505, 507 (2000).
16 Phillips, supra note 10, at 140-42.
17 See BLS SURVEY, supra note 12, at 4; see also Lea B. Vaughn, Victimized
Twice-The Intersection of Domestic Violence and the Workplace: Legal Reform
Through Curriculum Development, 47 LoY. L. REV. 231, 237 (2001) (discussing similar
categorizations of workplace violence). Perhaps as the result of the link between
domestic and workplace violence, "[w]ith respect to women, workplace violence is the
number one cause of workplace death in the United States." Whitten & Mosley, supra
note 15, at 506.
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BLS. 18 Additionally, workplace violence takes a toll in the workplace in
many ways, including employee fear and anxiety, absenteeism, attrition,
decreased productivity, and lower employee morale. 19
Violent episodes between employees are perhaps the most difficult type
of workplace violence to prevent. As one author has noted, "[c]o-worker
violence is the most insidious type of workplace violence and probably the
hardest to control since most employees need relatively free access to the
workplace and to one another in order to do their jobs.' '20 As a result,
employers cannot use security systems, guards, or other types of external
security measures to keep such violence from the workplace. Rather,
employee-on-employee workplace violence must be prevented through
employers' monitoring and adoption of policies to deal with the behavior of
their own employees who populate the workplace every day. 21
Clearly, workplace violence is recognized as a serious problem in the
American workplace. 22 As one commentator has reported: "America has
18 See BLS SURVEY, supra note 12, at 9. Some of the most common risk factors for
workplace violence include contact with the public; exchange of money; delivery of
passengers, goods, and services; having a mobile workplace (such as a taxicab); working
with volatile and unstable persons; working in isolation; working late at night or in the
early morning; working in high crime areas; guarding valuables; and working in
community-based settings. Jane Lipscomb et al., Perspectives on Legal Strategies to
Prevent Workplace Violence, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHics 166, 167 (2002).
19 BLS SURVEY, supra note 12, at 7. See also Riley, supra note 11, at 2-3
("Workplace violence also has a ripple effect, affecting not only the targeted victim, but
everyone associated with the workplace.").
20 Barbara Ryniker Evans, When Violence Invades: Coming to Blows in the
Workplace, 43 LA. B. J. 448,449 (1996).
21 Riley, supra note 11, at 6 ("Physical security measures may be ineffective in
preventing co-worker/former employee.., workplace violence.").
22 The problem is not unique to the United States. See Bini Litwin, A Conceptual
Framework for a Multi-Factor, Multi-Level Analysis of the Origins of Workplace
Violence, 8 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 825, 828-32 (2002) ("Violence in the workplace is
not a phenomenon unique to any particular country or culture."); see also Robert S.
Goldberg, Comment, Victims of Criminal Violence in the Workplace: An Assessment of
Remedies in the United States and Great Britain, 18 CoMP. LAB. L.J. 397, 398 (1997)
("Both the statistics, and the violent behavior of our youth, suggest that in Great Britain
and in the United States, violence in the workplace is, and will continue to be, a persistent
and pervasive problem."). For a contrary viewpoint on the extent of the problem of
workplace violence, see Vicki A. Laden & Gregory Schwartz, Psychiatric Disabilities,
the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the New Workplace Violence Account, 21
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 246 (2000). Ms. Laden and Mr. Schwartz essentially argue
that the exaggerated threat of workplace violence has contributed to the judicial
weakening of the protections of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Id. at 249-51, 270.
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become increasingly aware of the growing problem of workplace violence...
Now, and perhaps permanently, violence has become commonplace." 23
Accordingly, given the ongoing and pervasive problem of violence in the
workplace, as set forth below in detail, this article posits that the arbitral
response to employers' adoption of zero-tolerance workplace violence
policies-one of the primary weapons employers utilize to deal with
workplace violence-has not necessarily been consistent with the concept of
zero-tolerance for workplace violence. Rather, although arbitrators
increasingly have begun to discuss the societal intolerance for and
condemnation of workplace violence, arbitrators' actions have not uniformly
kept up with their words when it comes to their review of discipline imposed
for employee violations of zero-tolerance workplace violence policies. 24
III. ZERO-TOLERANCE WORKPLACE VIOLENCE POLICIES
AND THE ARBITRAL RESPONSE
A. Zero-Tolerance Workplace Violence Policies
Perhaps the most prevalent employer response to the problem of
workplace violence has been the adoption of a zero-tolerance workplace
violence policy. 25 Indeed, nearly every discussion of employer personnel
23 Stephen Kelson, Violence Against Lawyers: The Increasingly Attacked
Profession, 10 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 260, 260 (2001). Mr. Kelson discusses an oft-ignored
area of workplace violence: violence against lawyers and the legal profession. Id.; accord
Phillips, supra note 10, at 193 ("Workplace violence is a serious problem that needs to be
addressed."); see also Thomas Faust & Michael Raffo, Local Trial Court Response to
Courthouse Safety, 576 ANNALS 91 (2001) (discussing the need for security in and around
courthouses).
24 The title of this article springs from this idea: namely, that arbitrators' actions in
reviewing employer disciplinary actions under zero-tolerance workplace violence policies
should keep pace with their own rhetoric (as well as the language in the policies
themselves) describing how serious the problem of workplace violence is and endorsing
the concept of zero-tolerance.
25 See Stephen J. Beaver, Comment, Beyond the Exclusivity Rule: Employer's
Liability for Workplace Violence, 81 MARQ. L. REv. 103, 120 (1997) ("In response to the
growing epidemic of workplace violence, employers have engaged in the practice of
monitoring employee conduct as a means of enforcing 'zero tolerance policies' for
violence in the workplace."). Some commentators have suggested that encouraging
employers to provide accurate references for former employees is another effective
method for eliminating workplace violence. See, e.g., Markita D. Cooper, Beyond Name,
Rank, and Serial Number: "No Comment" Job Reference Policies, Violent Employees
and the Need for Disclosure-Shield Legislation, 5 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 287, 334 (1998)
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policies includes a recommendation for some version of a zero-tolerance
workplace policy.26 Although the provisions will vary from policy to policy,
the basic premise of each such policy is that the employer has drawn a line in
the sand in regard to certain types of violent or threatening employee
behavior. This then places employees on notice that, if an employee steps
over that line, the employee will be discharged or otherwise disciplined
without exception. 27 Even in unionized workplaces, which typically have
collective bargaining agreements that limit the employer's right to discipline
and discharge employees except where just cause exists, zero-tolerance
workplace violence policies prevail.28 One commentator has described that
"[t]he smartest and most defensive way to be able to investigate, document,
and discipline workplace violence is to develop a clear, written company
policy that indicates zero-tolerance towards any type of threat, actual or
("In today's world of increasing workplace violence, prospective employers need to
know if job applicants have engaged in violent conduct in the workplace."). For a
contrary view, see John Ashby, Note, Employment References: Should Employers Have
an Affirmative Duty to Report Employee Misconduct to Inquiring Prospective
Employers?, 46 ARiz. L. REv. 117, 148 (2004) (arguing that affirmative duty of
disclosure of workplace violence to prospective employers would do little to diminish
workplace violence).
26 See Lipscomb et al., supra note 18, at 170 (recommending adoption of a policy
for "zero-tolerance for threats and physical assaults and communication of this message
to managers, supervisors, staff ...."); Kimberly Gee Stith, Violence in the Workplace:
The Armed and Angry Employee, 29 THE BRIEF 8, 16 (1999) (recommending the
promotion of a "violence-free environment" through, inter alia, the adoption of a "written
zero-tolerance policy prohibiting weapons of any kind at the job."); William R. Corbett,
The Need for a Revitalized Common Law of the Workplace, 69 BROOK. L. REv. 91, 100
n.45 (2003) ("A legislative panel in Massachusetts studying workplace violence ...
recommended that employers adopt 'zero tolerance policies' on workplace violence...
."); Judy Perry Martinez, Making a Difference: Some Thoughts on Community
Collaboration and Individual Effort, 47 Loy. L. REv. 33, 39 (2001) (advocating, in the
domestic violence prevention context, that managers use their "position in management
of [their] company to persuade [their] employer to adopt a workplace violence policy and
safety plan for all employees."). See also FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA A. ELKOURI, How
ARBITRATION WORKS 1015 (Allen Miles Ruben ed., 6th ed. 2003) ("Increasingly,
employers cite the requirements of the [Occupational Safety and Health Act's] 'general
duty' clause to support the implementation and enforcement of zero-tolerance policies
against workplace violence.").
27 See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 26, at 1020-21.
28 See, e.g., Philip Morris U.S.A., 2006 WL 3905024 (May 20, 2006) (Nolan, Arb.)
("Like all major employers, [the employer] has strong policies against workplace
violence and harassment.").
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implied. Policy formation gives employees notice as to the direction and
discretion used by employers." 29
Given the seeming societal consensus on the problem of workplace
violence and the movement of employers towards ensuring that no acts of
violence are tolerated in their respective workplaces, one would expect that
employers would tend to prevail in labor arbitrations in which the employee
was discharged for a violation of a zero-tolerance workplace violence policy.
As set forth below, however, it is clear based upon a review of reported
arbitration decisions that arbitrators do not necessarily defer to zero-tolerance
enforcement in the workplace violence arena. As one union's website puts it,
at the current time, "[a] zero-tolerance policy does not take away the
arbitrator's authority to determine whether the discipline was for just
cause."
30
B. The Arbitral Response
A review of recent decisionmaking by labor arbitrators in the context of
discipline for violations of zero-tolerance workplace violence policies is
instructive. 31 In order to fully illuminate these issues, consider the following
arbitration decisions.
1. The Case of Self Defense
In Archer Daniels Midland Co.,32 the employer discharged two
employees who engaged in a fistfight over which employee had been
assigned to perform a particular job. 33 In doing so, the employer relied upon
a zero-tolerance workplace violence policy that provided, in relevant part:
29 Kimberly Smith, Comment, A Plea for Mandatory Disclosure: Urging
Michigan's Legislature to Protect Employees Against Increasing Phenomena of
Workplace Violence, 79 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 611, 627 (2002).
30 Communications Workers of America, Local 7804, Workplace Threats: Threats
of Violence, http://www.cwalocal7804.org/wkplthreat.htm (last visited March 1, 2009).
31 As many labor arbitration decisions are never reported or published, it is
impossible to undertake a comprehensive review of labor arbitration decisions in this
area.
32 Archer Daniels Midland Co., 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1077 (2007) (Staudohar,
Arb.).
33 Id. at 1078.
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Workplace violence can be any act of physical violence,
threats of physical violence, harassment, intimidation, or other
threatening or disruptive behavior that occurs in the workplace...
It has become a reasonable prudent practice in the business
community to establish procedures for the prevention of, and
appropriate response to, violence in the workplace. The primary
reasons for these procedures are to reduce the risk of violence
aimed at employees and company property, and wherein possible,
to provide a work environment free of any intimidating or coercive
behavior. The [employer's] Workplace Threats and Violence
Procedures established zero-tolerance for threats and violence in
the workplace.34
The union grieved the termination of the employee who it believed was
not responsible for starting the fight, asserting that, despite the existence of
the zero-tolerance policy, the employer did not have just cause to discharge
the grievant.35 More specifically, the union argued that the employer's
decision to discharge should not stand because the grievant's participation in
the fight was merely self-defense, in that the other employee had provoked
the grievant and then escalated the physical confrontation. 3 6
Although acknowledging that the grievant played a role in escalating the
conflict and should be held culpable for his role in the violent episode, the
arbitrator determined that the employer did not have just cause to discharge
the grievant.3 7 In so holding, the arbitrator perhaps acknowledged his
decision's conflict with the company's zero-tolerance workplace violence
policy when he wrote:
On cross-examination, the [g]rievant admitted that he pushed
[the other employee] before [the other employee] touched him.
Therefore, the [g]rievant said he made first contact in the fight. He
also acknowledged being trained under the zero tolerance policy
and understood that there would not be a second chance if he
participated in a fight.3 8
34 Id. at 1080 (emphasis in original). Presumably, fighting would run afoul of the
prohibitions on workplace violence contained in this policy.
35 Id. at 1081.
36 Id. The other employee involved in the fight contradicted this testimony, asserting
that the grievant had been the aggressor during the altercation. Id. at 1082.
37 Id. at 1083.
38 Archer Daniels Midland Co., 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 1083.
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Despite these admissions, the arbitrator did not defer to the employer's
imposition of discipline under the zero-tolerance policy. 39 Rather, the
arbitrator chose to reinstate the employee to his position.40 Specifically, the
arbitrator held that the grievant's violent behavior should be excused-at
least to the point of allowing him to return to his job-because the other
employee involved in the altercation had been the "instigator of the fight."41
In overturning the employer's decision, however, the arbitrator stated his
belief that "the [g]rievant is held accountable under the [c]ompany's zero-
tolerance policy." 42
Thus, despite the fact that the company had promulgated a policy stating
that an employee would be discharged if the employee engaged in a fight,
trained employees in that policy, and then attempted to enforce the policy
against an employee who had made the first physical contact in a violent
workplace altercation, the arbitrator still did not believe that the company
had just cause to discharge the employee. Clearly, therefore, the arbitrator
did not regard the adoption of a zero-tolerance policy as having any
limitation on his ability to reinstate an employee. Nor did the arbitrator
believe that the employer's decision to draw a line in the sand in regard to
violent workplace episodes was entitled to any amount of deference.43 To the
contrary, the arbitrator applied his own standards for the treatment of
workplace violence and reinstated the employee to his position in
contravention of the intent of the zero-tolerance policy.44
39 Id.
40 Id. The employee was reinstated to his position without any back pay, but with
restoration of his seniority rights. Id. at 1084.
41 Id. at 1083.
42 Id. The arbitrator did not specifically explain how his decision, in the context of
zero-tolerance for workplace violence, held the grievant accountable under the policy,
given the grievant's express admission that he delivered the first blow in the physical
confrontation.
43 The arbitrator also did not discuss the problem of workplace violence or what, in
the context of dealing with that problem, employers would have to do to get an arbitrator
to sustain the discharge of an employee who threw the first punch in a fight in the
workplace arising out of a work-related dispute.
44 This fact must have troubled the arbitrator somewhat, as the last line of his
decision attempted to reconcile his decision with the intent of the zero-tolerance policy.
Archer Daniels Midland Co., 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 1083. See discussion, supra
note 42.
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2. The Flawed Investigation and Stressed Workforce Case
The arbitrator in Lockheed Martin Aeronautics. Co.45 was asked to
consider whether the employer had just cause to discharge an employee who
took part in a series of altercations with a fellow employee during his shift.46
Specifically, the grievant engaged in a sequence of heated arguments with an
engineer who was assigned to the grievant's work project. 47 The grievant
also had been observed on frequent occasions sitting in his car "fixated on
staring straight ahead."'48 Although the grievant had no record of discipline
based upon his behavior, his actions in the workplace had been sufficiently
strange and unsettling such that other employees provided statements to the
employer indicating that "they were concerned for their safety based on the
[g]rievant's behavior. '49
Like the employer in Archer Daniels Midland Co.,5° the employer had
adopted a zero-tolerance workplace violence policy, which provided in
relevant part that the employer "will not tolerate or condone any acts or
threats of violence committed by or against our employees .... -51 The
arbitrator further described the employer's reason for adopting the zero-
tolerance policy:
The [e]mployer is extremely sensitive about any behavior
indicators, which could lead to workplace violence. In July 2003 in
the [c]ompany's Meridian Mississippi plant an employee, armed
with multiple firearms, shot and killed five co-workers and
wounded nine more co-workers before killing himself. As a result
of this incident the [c]ompany's leadership instituted a zero-
tolerance policy against workplace violence. This effort included
management policy postings in common areas and affirmations
from employees that they would abide by conduct rules prohibiting
45 Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA).244 (2006) (Riker,
Arb.).
46 Id. at 246.
47 Id.
48 Id. The company concluded that this was indicative of "highly stressed behavior"
on the part of the grievant. Id.
49 Id.
50 See Archer Daniels Midland Co., 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1077 (2007)
(Staudohar, Arb.).
51 Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 245.
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acts of intimidation or any behavior that could adversely affect the
interests or reputation of the [c]ompany. 52
The grievant was aware of the zero-tolerance policy, having signed an
employee conduct affirmation setting forth the policy on two separate
occasions. 53 Moreover, the grievant had received counseling approximately a
month before his discharge concerning the fact that he had engaged in
inappropriate behavior that was indicative of the potential for workplace
violence. 5
4
Despite the existence of the zero-tolerance policy and the employer's sad
history with the issue, the arbitrator overturned the employer's decision to
discharge the grievant. 55 The arbitrator reasoned that the employer's
investigation of the incident was flawed because it primarily sought only one
side of the story, that of the engineer who became involved in the altercation
with the grievant. 56 Although noting that the employer, in discharging the
grievant, also had been concerned about previous incidents that may have
demonstrated a propensity for violence on the part of the grievant, the
arbitrator found that those concerns were not established because they merely
were based upon "a collection of witness statements largely from the
[e]mployer's management or professional staff."' 57 Overall, while conceding
52 Id. at 246.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 253.
56 Id. at 250. In so holding, the arbitrator conceded that the investigation was not
completely one-sided because the grievant "did provide a statement of the event..."Id.
57 Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 251. It is not
clear why the arbitrator would automatically disregard the significance or question the
credibility of such statements. He did, however, explain a portion of his reasoning as
follows:
Within the witnesses' statements and testimony presented by the [e]mployer
there are other alleged instances of hostile or threatening behavior by [the grievant]
that would lend credence toward augmenting the rationale for his immediate
discharge. This included instances of "staring down" personnel, deliberately
bumping into others, as well as multiple verbal exchanges. From the breadth of
witness statements and testimony it is credible that this type of behavior may have
occurred and it would have been appropriate for the [e]mployer to apply this as
background, indicating a potentially progressively deteriorating aggressive behavior
pattern by the [g]rievant that needed attention or action. However, there was no
documentation that showed the [g]rievant was timely challenged or counseled.
Further, other evidence cited to justify the termination was also either marginally
investigated or incomplete.
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that the grievant had a history of troubling incidents in the workplace, the
arbitrator did not believe that the investigation of the grievant's past, as well
as the incident that led to his termination, were sufficient to support a
discharge. 58 The arbitrator further appeared to justify the grievant's behavior,
in part, as the result of a stressful working environment, noting that "[t]he
testimony reveals a very stressful scene of a team working long hours and
near continuous workdays to meet a high-profile project requirement. '59
Like the arbitrator in Archer Daniels Midland,60 the Lockheed Martin
arbitrator spoke approvingly of the employer's zero-tolerance workplace
violence policy: "It is also appropriate to consider the [e]mployer's
obligation to provide a safe workplace and thus be justified to aggressively
pursue controlling any indicators that may be threatening." 61 Clearly,
however, the arbitrator did not find such considerations compelling enough
to uphold the grievant's discharge for violating the employer's policy against
workplace violence. 62 Indeed, the arbitrator did not uphold any discipline
whatsoever against the grievant, reinstating him with an award of full back
pay and benefits and a directive to remove any notation of discipline
stemming from the incident from the grievant's personnel file.63
Id.
5 8 Id. at 251-52.
59 Id. at 252-53. Although it is clear that the purported working environment played
a role in the arbitrator's decision, it is not clear how such considerations fit within the
logic of the arbitrator's reliance on the purportedly flawed investigation. Indeed, if, as the
arbitrator seemed to suggest, the grievant's behavior would have justified discharge under
the zero-tolerance policy if there had been sufficient proof that flowed from an adequate
investigation, then how would the existence of a stressful work environment ultimately
be relevant or admissible? Moreover, if the existence of a stressful work environment is a
justification for workplace violence, then it is doubtful that many decisions to terminate
employees for workplace violence will be upheld in arbitration, as such a claim could be
made in nearly every American workplace.
60 See Archer Daniels Midland Co., 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1077 (2007)
(Staudohar, Arb.).
61 Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 252.
62 As noted above, this decision must be considered in light of the employer's
previous experience with work place violence, in which fourteen employees were either
killed or wounded in a shooting at another facility. See id. at 245.
63 Id. at 253-54.
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3. The Publicity Failure Case
In Horsehead Corp.,64 the employer discharged the grievant for
physically attacking a co-worker who visited his work area.65 During the
altercation, the grievant "struck" the other employee several times and
threatened to "kick his ass."'66 In advance of the arbitration, the employer
converted the discharge of the grievant to a suspension when it learned that
the other employee involved in the altercation (who had also been
discharged) was not likely to appear as a witness or provide testimony at the
grievant's arbitration.67 Despite the reduced punishment, the union still
pursued its grievance challenging the employer's decision to issue any
discipline at all to the employee.68
Shortly before the altercation between the grievant and his co-worker,
the employer adopted a zero-tolerance workplace violence policy. 69
Although he referenced the policy in his discussion of the appropriateness of
discipline for the employee, the arbitrator nevertheless reduced the grievant's
discipline to a fourteen day suspension and ordered that he receive back pay
for any other time he was out of work.70 In doing so, the arbitrator appeared
to find significant the fact that "[a]lthough it appears that the [c]ompany
warned employees of management's lowered tolerance for workplace
altercations, the record contains no clear indication that the [c]ompany
published a formulary of penalties or otherwise informed employees of the
penalties that might now apply to workplace altercations." 71
64 Horsehead Corp., 2006 WL 3876579 (May 12, 2006) (Dissen, Arb.). As Westlaw
does not provide pinpoint citations for certain arbitration decisions reported in its labor
arbitration database, none will be provided for citations to those materials.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id. Presumably, the employer was concerned about its ability to prove its case
without the benefit of testimony from the individual who allegedly was struck by the
grievant.
68 Id.
69 Id. Specifically, the arbitrator noted that "after several employee skirmishes had
occurred at that facility, management became sufficiently concerned that it announced
and posted a 'zero-tolerance' policy toward workplace violence." Horsehead Corp., 2006
WL 3876579.
70 Horsehead Corp., 2006 WL 3876579 (May 12, 2006) (Dissen, Arb.).
71 Id. Nonetheless, the arbitrator specifically found that it was "evident from the
[g]rievant's own testimony that he engaged in conduct that the [c]ompany had
proscribed." Id.
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Accordingly, despite the fact that the employer adopted a policy of zero-
tolerance for workplace violence, distributed it to employees, and disciplined
an employee in accordance with its stated desire to take incidents of
workplace violence very seriously, the arbitrator still did not uphold the
discipline. 72 In regard to the issue of publishing a "formulary of penalties,"
the arbitrator provided no guidance whatsoever as to what would be an
appropriate penalty for particular incidents of workplace violence, nor is
there any indication that the arbitrator would defer to such a formulary if he
disagreed with the severity of the penalties adopted by the employer. 73
4. The Case of the Emotional Abuser
Mercury Marine Division of Brunswick Corp.74 provided the arbitrator
with the opportunity to decide whether an employer had just cause to
discharge an employee who purportedly violated a newly adopted zero-
tolerance workplace violence policy.75 The policy made clear the employer's
interest in safety and providing a violence-free working environment for its
employees:
[The employer] is committed to promoting a workplace that is
comfortable, safe, productive and free from violence. Safety in our
business must be part of every operation. And without question, it
is every employee's and manager's responsibility at all levels to
help ensure a safe work place. To accomplish this, every one must
be constantly aware of conditions that can produce violence and
injuries. Conduct that is violent or threatens violence or emotional
abuse will not be tolerated and, depending on the seriousness of the
incident, may lead to termination of employment. 76
72 The arbitrator specifically noted that the reasoning behind the employer's decision
to adopt the workplace violence policy was the "deterrent effect." Id.
73 As with the decisions of the arbitrators in Archer Daniels Midland Co., 123 Lab.
Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1077 (2007) (Staudohar, Arb.) and Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co.,
123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 244, 252 (2006) (Riker, Arb.), the arbitrator also did not place
any weight on the fact that the particular incident leading to the employer's decisions to
discharge the grievant might be indicative of the possibility of a more violent employee
incident in the future.
74 Mercury Marine Div. of Brunswick Corp., 2006 WL 1310350 (Feb. 28, 2006)
(Suntrup, Arb.).
75 The workplace violence policy had gone into effect approximately ten months
before the incident that led to the grievant's discharge. Id.
76 Id. As suggested by the arbitrator in Horsehead Corp., 2006 WL 3876579 (May
12, 2006) (Dissen, Arb.), this policy set forth examples of the types of violent behavior
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The employer distributed the zero-tolerance policy to its employees and
made clear to all employees that it applied to everyone who entered its
facilities, including "non-employees and independent contractors. 77
The incident that led to the employer's decision to discharge the grievant
was an altercation between the grievant and a co-worker.78 Specifically, the
employer concluded after an investigation that the grievant had given "the
finger" to the co-worker when the co-worker looked in his direction.79 When
the co-worker then confronted him, the grievant charged him, grabbing his
hair and leaving marks on his neck as the result of physical contact. 80
Following an investigation, the employer determined that the grievant had
violated its new workplace violence policy, and terminated his
employment. 81 In particular, the employer determined that the grievant had
"engaged in inappropriate, physically aggressive conduct toward a co-
worker." 82
The arbitrator, however, did not agree with the employer's decision to
discharge the grievant.8 3 Although concluding that the grievant had both
pushed and grabbed his co-worker, the arbitrator nonetheless decided that the
employer did not have just cause for the discharge. 84 In particular, the
arbitrator found significant the fact that the workplace violence policy also
prohibited "emotional abuse. '8 5 The arbitrator determined that the co-worker
had played a larger role in the incident than the employer had concluded by
somehow provoking the grievant's violent reaction, thus presumably
rendering him guilty of "emotionally abusing" the grievant.8 6 The arbitrator
that would subject the employee to discipline, including termination of employment,
under the policy. Id.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Mercury Marine Div. of Brunswick Corp., 2006 WL 1310350.
80 Id. Not surprisingly, the grievant's account of the story differed radically from the
co-workers, forcing the employer to make a judgment call about what happened and who
was responsible for the incident. Id.
81 Id.
82 Id. The workplace violence policy specifically noted that "[e]mployees engaging
in a fight on company property or at a company-sponsored function will be terminated."
Id.
83 Mercury Marine Div. of Brunswick Corp., 2006 WL 1310350.
84 Id. The arbitrator also concluded that the grievant's physical contact resulted in a
scratch to the neck of his fellow employee. Id.
85 Id.
86 Id. The arbitrator apparently concluded that the co-worker was responsible for
posting documents about recent legal difficulties experienced by the grievant. Id.
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then found that the co-worker's testimony at the hearing was not credible,
while the grievant's testimony had been. 87
Thus, the arbitrator found that although the grievant had been in violation
of the physical aggression portion of the workplace violence policy, he did
not believe termination to be an appropriate penalty.88 The basis for the
reduction in penalty was the "extenuating circumstances" that motivated the
grievant's violent behavior, namely the purported "emotional abuse" he
suffered from his co-worker.89 The arbitrator then determined that a ninety-
day suspension was sufficient punishment for the grievant's behavior, and
reinstated him to his job with back pay awarded for any time he was out of
work beyond the ninety-day suspension. 90 In issuing the award, the arbitrator
attempted to take account of the employer's zero-tolerance policy by noting
that he had viewed the case record "through the prism of the employer's
workplace violence policies." 91
5. The "Exceptional" Mitigating Factors Case
In Sodexho Management, Inc.,92 the employer discharged the grievant for
slapping the wrist of a co-worker after a workplace disagreement. 93 As the
arbitrator made clear in his ruling, the employer's decision was "approved..
. in view of the [c]ompany's 'zero-tolerance policy' in cases of 'workplace
violence' ..... 94 At the arbitration, however, the employer went beyond the
specific slapping incident and introduced the contents of the grievant's
personnel file, which included two counseling notices for other misconduct,
87 Mercury Marine Div. of Brunswick Corp., 2006 WL 1310350.
88 Id. Significantly, the arbitrator made this finding despite the fact that fighting-a
violation of the physical aggression portion of the policy-is specifically delineated as a
dischargeable offense in the policy, a fact that presumably would have satisfied the
arbitrator's interest in a formulary of penalties for certain offenses in Horsehead Corp.,
2006 WL 3876579 (May 12, 2006) (Dissen, Arb.).
89 Mercury Marine Div. of Brunswick Corp., 2006 WL 1310350.
90 Id.
91 Id. It is unclear from the decision exactly what the arbitrator's statement about
viewing the case through the "prism" of the policy meant given the inconsistency
between the arbitrator's decision and the terms of the policy.
92 Sodexho Mgmt., Inc., 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1643 (2007) (Kaufman, Arb.).
93 Id. at 1645. The slap was hard enough that it left a red mark on the wrist of the co-
worker. Id. at 1644.
94 Id. at 1645. Indeed, the collective bargaining agreement specifically provided that
employees may be "immediately discharged" if found guilty of "physical violence." Id. at
1647.
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as well as "two statements by other employees accusing [the g]rievant of
threatening to 'punch' another employee and having 'temper tantrums."' 95
The arbitrator found that the employer had met its burden of proving that
the grievant had slapped the co-worker's wrist.96 The arbitrator found,
however, that such conduct was not sufficient to sustain the employer's
decision to discharge. 97 Specifically, because the employer had considered
the employee's work record in making the decision to discharge, the
arbitrator found that he had the right to review the decision to see if the
proposed discharge was mitigated by other factors in support of the
grievant. 98
Although the employer determined that it did not believe there was any
basis to mitigate the discharge decision-indeed, the grievant's work record
contained at least two counseling notices for poor work performance, as well
as two complaints by other employees concerning aggressive behavior by the
grievant-the arbitrator ultimately disagreed with that determination and
found that the grievant's work record did provide a basis for overturning the
discharge decision. 99 That is, the arbitrator relied on the fact that a manager
had provided the grievant with a good job reference after the slapping
incident took place. 100 Despite the fact that the reference had not been
approved by the employer as required by company policy and the employer
did not even know that such a reference letter had been written until a few
days before the arbitration, the arbitrator found that the existence of the
positive reference weighed in favor of mitigating the decision to discharge
the grievant.10 1 The arbitrator further found "exceptional" the fact that the
grievant had been asked to work extra hours on the same day that she had
been accused of slapping the co-worker. 10 2 The arbitrator thus concluded
"that there is a basis for mitigation in this case, and will direct that the
95 Id at 1645.
96 Sodexho Mgmt., Inc., 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 1647. As noted by the
arbitrator, the burden of proof in a discharge labor arbitration rests with the employer. Id.
97 Id. at 1648.
98 Id. at 1647.
99 Id. at 1647-48.
100 Id. at 1648. The reference praised the grievant for, among other things, being
dependable, showing up on-time, and working hard. Sodexho Mgmt. Inc., 123 Lab. Arb.
Rep. (BNA) at 1648.
101 Id. at 1645, 1648.
102 Id. at 1648.
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discharge be reversed and that the [g]rievant be reinstated without loss of
seniority."' 103
6. Summary
Although there are certainly examples of arbitrators who have accepted
and upheld the concept of zero-tolerance for workplace violence, 10 4 the
arbitral reaction to such policies has not been uniformly supportive of the
concept of zero-tolerance. Whether it be because of mitigating factors such
as the employee's work record, provocation, self-defense, the adequacy of
the employer's investigation into the misconduct, or notice issues relating to
informing employees of the degree of penalty they may receive for engaging
in violent behavior, many arbitrators apparently have not responded to the
proliferation of zero-tolerance workplace violence policies by deferring to
managerial disciplinary decisions for workplace violence or otherwise
limiting the types of procedural arguments or exculpatory employee defenses
typically found in other types of discharge cases.10 5 Thus, although American
employers appear to be moving toward a consensus that workplace violence
is a serious problem that cannot be tolerated in any way, shape, or form,
labor arbitrators have not consistently issued rulings in accord with that
103 Id. The arbitrator did not order the employer to pay the grievant any back pay.
Id.
104 For example, in Lansing Community College, 122 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1392,
1401 (2006) (McDonald, Arb.), the arbitrator upheld a discharge for a violation of a zero-
tolerance workplace violence policy. In doing so, the arbitrator noted the trend toward
zero-tolerance, as well as the employer's obligation to safeguard its workplace:
In this case, the charge against the grievant is a serious one.
Certainly, workplace violence is one of the foremost concerns in our
society today and with both [e]mployers and [u]nions alike. In response to
those concerns, many [e]mployers have instituted policies to protect
workers, both in terms of threats of physical harm as well as actual
physical harm. This involves the implementation of the [employer's]
Workplace Violence Policy. This policy is in keeping with the general
philosophy that an [e]mployer has a responsibility to provide a safe
working environment.
Id. at 1400; See also Bell Helicopter Textron Inc., 120 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1819, 1824
(2005) (Allen, Arb.) (upholding discharge for violation of zero-tolerance policy); Penske
Truck Leasing Co., 122 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1355 (2006) (Watkins, Arb.) (same);
ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 26, at 1020 (same).
105 See supra note 9 for a discussion of the seven tests ofjust cause and the potential
defenses available to employees under those tests.
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trend. 10 6 Instead, many arbitrators appear inclined to pay lip service to the
problem of workplace violence and the employer's desire to rid its workplace
of such behavior through the adoption of a zero-tolerance policy, while at the
same time treating workplace violence cases the same as any other run-of-
the-mill employment policy violations. Indeed, some arbitrators appear
openly defensive about this fact:
The [c]ompany may feel that since this discharge was found to
be improper that the [g]rievant and any employee in the future may
violate with impunity the [clompany's Standards of Conduct
Policy and Violence in the Workplace Policy. The arbitrator
recognizes the critical importance of both of these policies. My
conclusions and opinion are based solely upon the record in the
instant case and are obviously not to be interpreted as creating any
precedent or license to employees to violate the [c]ompany's
Standards of Conduct Policy or its Violence in the Workplace
Policy or any other [c]ompany policy, rule or regulation. 107
Defensiveness aside and as set forth in detail below, to more
appropriately deal with the problem of workplace violence, arbitrators must
alter their decisionmaking to account for true zero-tolerance in the workplace
violence area.
IV. ZERO-TOLERANCE WORKPLACE VIOLENCE CASES-
SOME SUGGESTED ARBITRAL CONSIDERATIONS
Although the issue of workplace violence as a societal problem has
become more and more prominent over the last few years, the cases
discussed in the previous section demonstrate that the decisionmaking of
labor arbitrators has not necessarily kept pace with society's thinking about
the issue. 108 Although it appears that arbitral decisionmaking in the context
106 See supra Part II for a discussion of the problem of workplace violence.
107 Safetran Sys. Corp., 120 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1362, 1366 (2005) (Felice,
Arb.). In Safetran, the arbitrator reinstated an employee who had been discharged by the
employer for threatening a co-worker in violation of a zero-tolerance workplace violence
policy. Id. at 1363-66.
108 The point of this article is not necessarily to argue that labor arbitrators do not
take workplace violence seriously. That is not the case. Nearly everyone, including labor
arbitrators, recognizes the problem and wants to deal with it. The question is whether
labor arbitrators can adjust their typical decisionmaking analysis in employee discharge
cases to adjust for the typical employer's response to workplace violence.
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of discharges for workplace violence has begun to evolve, it has not caught
up with the societal response to the problem. 10 9 As set forth at length above,
one of the primary employer responses to workplace violence has been the
adoption of zero-tolerance workplace violence policies that attempt to hold
employees accountable for any violent actions in the workplaceo10 Although
some arbitrators have enforced such policies with an eye toward zero-
tolerance,"' others treat a violation of a zero-tolerance workplace violence
policy as no different than a violation of any other employer policy, with no
regard to the importance of deterrence, the seriousness of the issue, or how
reinstatement of employees affects employees' views on the meaning of
"zero-tolerance."' 12 The premise of this article is that arbitral decision-
making in this area of labor law must evolve, just as society's views on and
responses to workplace violence have changed over time.
As an initial matter, arbitrators need to be cognizant of the fact that
workplace violence is different than other types of employee disciplinary
offenses. It is not about productivity, absenteeism, insubordination, or any
other types of archetypal poor work performance that impact an employer's
work operations. Rather, unlike those ordinary performance issues dealt with
by employers on a daily basis, workplace violence has the ability to affect
people's lives in a violent and often irreversible way." l3 For that reason,
arbitrators need to be more accepting of the concept of zero-tolerance, even
where it involves offenses that do not, at first blush, appear serious enough to
warrant severe discipline under an arbitrator's typical analysis of just
cause. 114 Case after case, and commentator after commentator, demonstrate
that nearly all of the most serious co-worker on co-worker episodes of
workplace violence are preceded by smaller employee disciplinary events
that were either ignored or never reported to the employer.1 5 If that is the
109 See supra Part III.B.
110 A good example of that accountability is spelled out in the University of
Virginia's Policy, which states, "This is a zero-tolerance policy, meaning that the
University disciplines or terminates every employee found to have violated this policy."
See University of Virginia Workplace Violence/Hostility Policy, supra note 3 (emphasis
added).
11 1 See supra note 104.
112 See supra Part III.B.
113 To understand this point one need look no further than the examples cited supra
in note 10, in which people's lives were torn apart by a violent incident in the workplace.
114 See supra note 9.
115 See, e.g., Golden States Foods Corp., 108 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 705, 707-08
n.1 (1997) (Gentile, Arb.) (noting that mental health professionals regard certain
threatening or violent behavior to be "early warning signs" for future more serious
284
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case, then arbitrators need to treat discipline of such employee behavior in
the same way as zero-tolerance polices do, with an eye toward nipping
violent behavior in the bud and creating an atmosphere that fosters employee
willingness to come forward to report violations of such policies."16
Stated another way, arbitrators always must be mindful of the fact that
workplace violence has the potential to directly impact the health and safety
of employees. Threats often precede physical assaults and murders in the
workplace. 17 Little incidents often precede larger and more deadly episodes
of employee violence. 118 Zero-tolerance policies are one of the few
disciplinary measures that employers have in their respective toolboxes to
attempt to remove violent employees from their workplaces and impress
upon employees the seriousness of such behavior.1 9 Arbitrators should not
weaken that tool in the face of the mounting evidence of how serious the
incidents). Indeed, in the litigation context, employers are often held liable if they
knowingly hire an individual with a history of violent misconduct. See Beaver, supra
note 25, at 118-19.
116 For an interesting discussion of arbitral decisionmaking in the context of
employee addictions as a defense to the imposition of discipline, see Marvin F. Hill, Jr. &
Tammy Westhoff, "No Song Unsung, No Wine Untasted"-Employee Addictions,
Dependencies, and Post-Discharge Rehabilitation: Another Look at the Victim Defense
in Labor Arbitration, 47 DRAKE L. REv. 399 (1999).
117 See Hayes, supra note 10, at 231-32. In arguing for the implementation of
worker ombuds programs to prevent workplace violence, Ms. Hayes concludes that "[t]he
most important function of the ombuds office in preventing workplace violence is dealing
with conflict. The obvious and inevitable result of unresolved conflict is violence....
[B]y targeting conflict (the root of violence) addressing it and taking steps to eliminate it,
an ombuds program can prevent violence." Id.
118 An example of a quick and decisive response to what initially appeared to be an
insignificant workplace threat is detailed in Kari Ricci, Review of Selected 2007
California Legislation: Civil Procedure: Chapter 476: A Three-Pronged Approach to
Addressing Issues of Domestic and Workplace Violence, 38 MCGEORGE L. REv. 61, 61-
62 (2007). Ms. Ricci relates the story of an employee who, upon being reprimanded by
his employer, made "indirect threats of violence" against his supervisor. Id. at 61. After
news of the confrontation spread through the workplace, another employee came forward
and told the employer that he had heard the same employee threaten to bring a gun to
work and shoot co-workers. Id. The employer immediately "obtained a temporary
restraining order to bar [the employee] from contact with his direct supervisor and
entering [the employer's] premises." Id.
119 In an analogous context, one commentator recently argued that "[e]mployment
discrimination continues to thrive, in part, because of the absence of zero tolerance
policies on this issue." Stephen Plass, Reinforcing Title VII with Zero Tolerance Rules, 39
SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 127, 156 (2005).
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
problem is and of the devastating impact such behavior can have on the lives
of employees.' 20
Indeed, even a casual perusal of the cases cited in the preceding section
of this article suggests that arbitrators have not yet caught on to the fact that
deterrence is one of the key factors separating workplace violence from other
types of employee misconduct. 121 For example, in Lockheed Martin,122 the
arbitrator clearly was troubled by the fact that the grievant had experienced a
series of incidents suggesting that he was either capable of or perhaps even
contemplating more serious violent behavior. 123 Yet the arbitrator felt
constrained to limit his analysis to only the case at hand and to further
disregard employee statements about other incidents suggesting that the
grievant may have actually been a ticking time bomb in that workplace. 124
Clearly, the arbitrator's decision in Lockheed Martin to return the grievant to
work sent a message to employees that is inconsistent both with current
societal thinking on dealing with the problem of workplace violence, as well
as the concept of zero-tolerance. Rather, the message to the grievant and his
co-workers in Lockheed Martin was that workplace violence is no different
and no more important than other types of poor work performance that may
120 Employers also cannot look to the courts to overturn arbitrator decisions that
weaken zero-tolerance workplace violence policies. See, e.g., David M. Glanstein, A Hail
Mary Pass: Public Policy Review of Arbitration Awards, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL.
297, 334 (2001) ("[T]he requirement for courts to find a violation of clear, well-defined,
and dominant public policy has made it very unlikely that an arbitrator['s] award will be
vacated on these grounds."); Judith Stilz Ogden, Do Public Policy Grounds Still Exist for
Vacating Arbitration Awards?, 20 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 87, 115-16 (2002) (same).
121 Goldberg, supra note 22, at 421. Mr. Goldberg argues that:
Deterrence is the primary, not derivative function of ex ante
solutions. An emerging ex ante solution to workplace violence is the
involvement of expert agencies that will formulate, and use sanctions to
enforce compliance with, mandatory employer precautions. Expenditures
on security and human resources might be more efficient and cheaper than
the current expenditures made by U.S. and British employers in attempting
to make their workplaces safe from violence.
Id.
122 See Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 244 (2006)
(Riker, Arb.); supra note 45 and accompanying discussion of the case.
123 Id. at 250-51.
124 Id.
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lead to discipline. 125 Plainly, such a message is inappropriate in this area of
labor law. 126 To the contrary, in assessing discipline under a zero-tolerance
workplace violence policy, arbitrators can and should consider both the
deterrent effect of the particular discipline, as well as the potential for future
incidents of violence in the workplace by either this employee or others. 127
To decide otherwise reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the
importance of the issue, as well as the societal consensus on how to deal with
the problem.
The arbitral treatment of zero-tolerance workplace violence policy cases
can be analogized to the evolution of arbitral thinking on the topic of sexual
harassment. Even after the Supreme Court's landmark 1986 decision in
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 128 it took many years for arbitrators to catch
up with the mounting societal condemnation of sexual harassment as
evidenced by the development of the law after Meritor Savings Bank.129
125 Put another way, the message sent by the arbitrator in Lockheed Martin is that
workplace violence will be tolerated and can be excused in the labor arbitration context.
126 For an interesting article asserting a link between the "frontier justice" notion
inherent in American culture and workplace violence, see Dianne R. Layden, Workplace
Violence: Frontier Justice on the Job, 23 LEGAL STUD. F. 479 (1999).
127 In a related context, one commentator has noted the importance of reinforcing
the concept of zero-tolerance in the fight to eradicate domestic violence. Sarah M. Teal,
Domestic Violence: The Quest for Zero-Tolerance in the United States and China: A
Comparative Analysis of the Legal and Medical Aspects of Domestic Violence in the
United States and China, 5 J.L. Soc'Y 313, 356-57 (2003). Some commentators have
explicitly noted the connection between domestic and workplace violence. See, e.g.,
Vaughn, supra note 17, at 234-39 ("This record of violence follows women into the
workplace."); Jennifer Moyer Gaines, Comment, Employer Liability for Domestic
Violence in the Workplace: Are Employers Walking a Tightrope Without a Safety Net?,
31 TEx. TECH L. REv. 139, 143 (2000) ("Because '[w]omen work outside the home in the
overwhelming majority of American families,' domestic violence has found a home in
the workplace.").
128 Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (holding that if the attention
from a female employee's supervisor were unwelcome, then the employee had a claim
for sexual harassment on the basis of a hostile work environment, even if sexual acts
were voluntary).
129 For example, in Boys Markets Inc., 88 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1304 (1987)
(Wilmoth, Arb.), decided one year after the Meritor Savings Bank case, the arbitrator was
asked to consider whether the employer had just cause to discharge an employee who
"r[a]n his finger in an upward movement between the buttocks of a female co-worker."
Id. at 1305. The arbitrator, noting the numerous examples of other labor arbitration cases
where sexually harassing conduct did not result in the discharge being upheld at
arbitration, found that "discharge [was] not [an] appropriate" punishment for such
behavior. Id. at 1306.
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Indeed, the historical "boys will be boys" mentality was often used to excuse
employees who were discharged for sexual harassment.' 30 Over time, as
societal disapproval for sexual harassment became more pronounced,
arbitrators began to hold employees more accountable for such behavior.' 3 '
Just as in the area of sexual harassment, arbitral decisionmaking in
workplace violence cases, particularly in the area of discipline for violations
of zero-tolerance workplace violence policies, must catch up with society's
disapproval of workplace violence and hold employees completely
accountable for all violent behavior in the workplace. 132
Finally, perhaps the most damaging message sent to employees from
arbitration decisions reinstating employees who violated a zero-tolerance
workplace violence policy is the one sent to the victims. Terrorized (and
often terrified) employees are forced to again work side-by-side with a
person who may have threatened or physically assaulted them. The message
to that person is clearly one that their own personal safety, feelings, or both,
do not matter in labor arbitration. Perhaps even more importantly, the
implicit message delivered to other employees, all of whom could be
potential victims of workplace violence, is that violent conduct should not be
reported because the employer cannot do anything about it anyway. Zero-
tolerance policies aside, when faced with the prospect of the bully, harasser,
or assaulter returning to work side-by-side with them in the workplace,
victims may decide that it is not even worth reporting the threat or violent
incident in the first place. 133
130 Id. at 1306.
131 Compare the arbitrator's decision in Boys Markets, discussed id., with the
arbitrator's decision in Ohio Dep't of Pub. Safety, 119 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1050
(2003) (Brookins, Arb.), decided more than fifteen years after the Meritor Savings Bank
decision, where the arbitrator found that the grievant's sexually harassing conduct "was
unwelcome, offensive, adversely affected [the victim's] job performance, and ultimately
was a major factor in constructively discharging her." Id. at 1056.
132 For a discussion of arbitrator decisionmaking in the sexual harassment area, see
Mollie H. Bowers & E. Patrick McDermott, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: How
Arbitrators Decide, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 439 (2000).
133 At least one commentator has pointed out this concern in the context of a
discussion of the arbitral treatment of domestic violence issues. Jennifer Atterbury,
Comment, Employment Protection and Domestic Violence: Addressing Abuse in the
Labor Grievance Process, 1998 J. DisP. RESOL. 165, 180 (1998). Ms. Atterbury wrote:
Employers will benefit from preventing workplace violence. Forty-
nine percent of senior executives say that domestic violence harms their
productivity. Productivity will increase if employees are not preoccupied
with violence erupting at work. Taking precautions to protect abused
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V. CONCLUSION
The quotation at the beginning of this article from a Rhode Island court
overturning an arbitrator's decision to reinstate an employee discharged by
his employer for workplace violence should be the guiding principle for
arbitrators as they consider employer disciplinary decisions under zero-
tolerance workplace violence policies. 134 The stakes are too high, and the
problem too serious, for arbitrators to treat workplace violence like any other
type of employee misconduct and reinstate offenders to the workplace. An
employer's decision to move toward true zero-tolerance for violent employee
behavior in the workplace should be viewed for what it is-part of the
evolving societal response to a problem that needs to be addressed by
employers and ultimately eliminated from the American workplace.
Arbitrators should join that evolution and issue decisions supportive of and in
conformity with the concept of zero-tolerance for workplace violence.
One commentator has described the problem of workplace violence as
follows:
From a social standpoint, who is at risk from workplace
violence? The answer to this question is both employees and third
parties, such as on-premises customers, consumers, and suppliers.
In 2000, workplace violence was the most significant security
concern for employers because of its financial and emotional
impact, which can devastate their businesses. Employers must
consider the economic costs of workplace violence, including lost
employees will also make other employees feel more safe. For example, a
witness to the [violent workplace episode] did not intervene because she
was fearful for her own safety.
Id. With respect to labor arbitrators' treatment of employee discipline resulting from
incidents of domestic violence, Ms. Atterbury argues that arbitrators should be more
educated about the domestic violence epidemic so that that their decisions in such cases
will be more attentive to the issue and its effect on women. Id. at 169-74, 181. For an
extensive discussion of the problem of domestic violence in the workplace, see Nicole
Buonocore Porter, Victimizing the Abused?: Is Termination the Solution When Domestic
Violence Comes to Work?, 12 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 275 (2006); see also Sandra S. Park,
Note, Working Towards Freedom from Abuse: Recognizing a "Public Policy" Exception
to Employment-At-Will for Domestic Violence Victims, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L.
121, 162 (2003) (advocating adoption of a public policy exception to the at-will
employment doctrine for employees who experience workplace problems as the result of
domestic abuse).
134 See Catholic Cemeteries v. R.I. Laborers Dist. Council, 177 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
2148, 2154 (2005).
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workdays, lost wages, lost revenue, and litigation costs.
Additionally, employers must also bear the human costs of
workplace violence such as diminished employee morale.
From a legal standpoint, however, the pressing issue concerns
who is liable for workplace violence. The most common answer is
employers. Thus, employers are contemplating their potential
liability and, to no surprise, hoping to limit their liability in the
context of workplace violence. 135
Employees bear the risk and pain of workplace violence, and employers bear
the attendant risk of liability. Labor arbitrators should not add to that risk (or
pain) by undercutting one of the only preventative measures employers have
to fight workplace violence-zero-tolerance workplace violence policies.
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135 Whitney L. Elzen, Comment, Workplace Violence: Vicarious Liability and
Negligence Theories as a Two-Fisted Approach to Employer Liability. Is Louisiana
Clinging to an Outmoded Theory?, 62 LA. L. REv. 897, 897-98 (2002).
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